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Abstract
Many questions about institutional trading behavior can only be answered if one
can track institutional equity ownership continuously, yet institutional ownership data
are only available on quarterly reporting dates. We infer institutional trading be-
havior from the “tape”, the Transactions and Quotes database of the New York Stock
Exchange, by regressing quarterly changes in reported institutional ownership on quar-
terly buy and sell volume in diﬀerent trade size categories. We ﬁnd that institutions in
aggregate demand liquidity, in that total buy (sell) volume predicts increasing (decreas-
ing) institutional ownership. Institutions also tend to trade in large or very small sizes,
in that buy (sell) volume at these sizes predicts increasing (decreasing) institutional
ownership, while the pattern reverses at intermediate trade sizes that are favored by
individuals. Our regression method predicts institutional ownership signiﬁcantly better
than the simple cutoﬀ rules used in previous research.
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How do institutional investors trade in equity markets? Do they hold stocks that deliver
high average returns? Do they arbitrage irrationalities in individual investors’ responses
to information? Are they a stabilizing or destabilizing inﬂuence on stock prices? These
questions have been the focus of a large and recent body of empirical literature.
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Wer-
mers (1999, 2000), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000a, b) show
that quarterly increases in institutional ownership and quarterly stock returns are contempo-
raneously correlated. Several studies investigate this relationship further, and ﬁnd evidence
that short-term expected returns are higher (lower) for stocks that have recently been subject
to signiﬁcant institutional buying (selling).1 Some authors, notably Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1992), suggest that institutional investors follow simple price-momentum strate-
gies that push stock prices away from fundamental values. This is disputed by others, such
as Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002), who ﬁnd that institutions are not simply fol-
lowing price-momentum strategies; rather, they sell shares to individuals when a stock price
increases in the absence of any news about underlying cash ﬂows.
One limitation of this literature is that it is diﬃcult to measure changes in institutional
ownership as they occur. While some countries, such as Finland, do record institutional own-
ership continuously, in the United States institutional positions are reported only quarterly in
13-F ﬁlings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. A quarterly data frequency makes
it hard to say whether institutions are reacting to stock price movements or causing price
movements, and makes it impossible to measure institutional responses to high-frequency
news such as earnings announcements.
To measure institutional trading at high frequency, some authors have looked at data
on equity transactions, available on the New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quotations
(TAQ) database. Most transactions can be identiﬁed as buy orders or sell orders using the
1See Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), Wermers (1999), Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers
(2000), and Gompers and Metrick (2001), among others.
2procedure of Lee and Ready (1991), which compares the transaction price to posted bid and
ask quotes.
Am o r ed i ﬃcult challenge is to identify orders as coming from institutions or individuals.
A common procedure is to label orders above some upper cutoﬀ size as institutional, and
those below a lower cutoﬀ size as individual. Trades at intermediate sizes remain unclassiﬁed.
Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) evaluate several alternative cutoﬀ rules by applying them to
the TORQ dataset, a sample of trades with complete identiﬁcation of market participants.
They ﬁnd, for example, that upper and lower cutoﬀs of $20,000 and $2,500 are most eﬀective
at accurately classifying trades in small stocks. Unfortunately the TORQ dataset includes
only 144 stocks over a three-month period in 1994 and it is not clear that these results apply
more generally or in more recent data.
In this paper we develop a new method for inferring high-frequency institutional trading
behavior. Our method combines two datasets that in the past have been used separately in
analyses of investor behavior. The TAQ database gives us trade-by-trade data pertaining to
all listed stocks on the NYSE and AMEX, NASDAQ national market system, and small cap
stocks, beginning in 1993. We restrict the current analysis to stocks traded on the NYSE and
AMEX. TAQ is essentially the “tape”, recording transactions prices and quantities of every
trade conducted on these exchanges. We match TAQ to the Spectrum database. Spectrum
records the SEC mandated 13-F ﬁlings of large institutional investors, providing quarterly
snapshots of institutional holdings. We use the cumulative quarterly trades recorded on the
“tape” to predict institutional holdings in Spectrum. By regressing changes in institutional
ownership on cumulative trades of diﬀerent sizes, we ﬁnd the best function mapping trade
size to institutional behavior. This function can be used to track institutional trading on a
daily or intra-daily basis.
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that institutions on average demand liquidity. Across all trades
(ignoring trade sizes), volume classiﬁable as buys predicts an increase and volume classiﬁable
as sells predicts a decline in reported institutional ownership. Thus, we conclude that
institutions use the liquidity provided by the specialist and possibly also provided by limit
3orders from individuals.
Second, we ﬁnd that buying at the ask and selling at the bid is more likely to be due
to institutions if the trade size is either very small or very large. Trades that are either
under $2,000 or over $30,000 in size are very likely to be initiated by institutions, whereas
intermediate size trades are relatively more likely to be by individuals.
Our third ﬁnding is that our method of inferring institutional buying and selling from the
“tape” signiﬁcantly outperforms the simple classiﬁcation rules in previous literature. For
example, a simple cut-oﬀ rule that classiﬁes all trades over $20,000 as institutional has a
negative R2 when used as a predictor of the change in institutional ownership. This is in
contrast to the 10 percent R2 obtained by our method.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the TAQ, Spectrum and
CRSP data used in the study, and conducts a preliminary data analysis. Section 3 presents
and applies our method for predicting institutional ownership. Section 4 concludes.
2. Preliminary data analysis
2.1. CRSP data
Shares outstanding, stock returns, share codes, exchange codes and prices for all stocks come
from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) daily and monthly ﬁles. In the
current analysis, we focus on ordinary common shares of ﬁrms incorporated in the United
States that traded on the NYSE and AMEX. Our sample begins in January 1993, and ends
in December 2000. We use the CRSP PERMNO, a permanent number assigned to each
security, to match CRSP data to TAQ and Spectrum data. Figure 1 shows the evolution of
the number of matched ﬁrms in our data over time. The maximum number of ﬁr m si s2 2 2 2 ,
in the third quarter of 1998. The minimum number of ﬁrms is 1843, in the ﬁrst quarter of
1993.
In the majority of our analysis, we present results for all ﬁrms, as well as for ﬁve quin-
tiles of ﬁrms, where quintile breakpoints and membership are determined by the market
4capitalization (size) of a ﬁrm at the start of each quarter. Our data are ﬁltered carefully,
as described below. After ﬁltering, our ﬁnal sample consists of 3402 ﬁrms. When sorted
quarterly into size quintiles, this results in 744 ﬁrms in the largest quintile, and between
1194 and 1422 ﬁrms in the other four quintiles (these numbers include transitions of ﬁrms
between quintiles), and 66,805 ﬁrm quarters in total.
2.2. TAQ data
The Transactions and Quotes (TAQ) Database of the New York Stock Exchange contains
trade-by-trade data pertaining to all listed stocks, beginning in 1993. TAQ records transac-
tions prices and quantities of all trades, as well as a record of all stock price quotes that were
made. TAQ lists stocks by their tickers. We map each ticker symbol to a CRSP PERMNO.
As tickers change over time, and are sometimes recycled or reassigned, this mapping changes
over time.
The TAQ database does not classify transactions as buys or sells. To classify the direction
of trade, we use an algorithm suggested by Lee and Ready (1991). This algorithm looks
at the price of each stock trade relative to contemporaneous quotes in the same stock to
determine whether a transaction is a buy or sell. In cases where this trade-quote comparison
cannot be accomplished, the algorithm classiﬁes trades that take place on an uptick as buys,
and trades that take place on a downtick as sells. The Lee-Ready algorithm cannot classify
some trades, including those executed at the opening auction of the NYSE, trades which are
labelled as having been batched or split up in execution, and cancelled trades. We aggregate
all these trades, together with “zero-tick” trades which cannot be reliably identiﬁed as buys
or sells, into a separate bin, and use this bin of unclassiﬁable trades as an additional input
into our prediction exercise.
Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) ﬁnd that the Lee-Ready classiﬁcation of buys and sells is
highly accurate; however it will inevitably misclassify some trades which will create mea-
surement error in our data. Appendix 1 describes in greater detail our implementation of
the Lee-Ready algorithm.
5Once we have classiﬁed trades as buys or sells, we assign them to bins based on their dollar
size. In all, we have 19 size bins whose lower cutoﬀs are $0, $2000, $3000, $5000, $7000,
$9000, $10,000, $20,000, $30,000, $50,000, $70,000, $90,000, $100,000, $200,000, $300,000,
$500,000, $700,000, $900,000, and $1 million. In several of our speciﬁcations below, we use
buy and sell bins separately, and in others, we subtract sells from buys to get the net order
ﬂow within each trade size bin. We aggregate all shares traded in these dollar size bins to
the daily frequency, and then normalize each daily bin by the daily shares outstanding as
reported in the CRSP database. This procedure ensures that our results are not distorted
by stock splits.
We aggregate the daily normalized trades within each quarter to obtain quarterly buy
and sell volume at each trade size. The diﬀerence between these is net order imbalance
or net order ﬂow. We normalize and aggregate unclassiﬁable volume in a similar fashion.
The sum of buy, sell, and unclassiﬁable volumes is the TAQ measure of total volume in each
stock-quarter.
We ﬁlter the data in order to eliminate potential sources of error. We ﬁrst exclude all
stock-quarters for which TAQ total volume as a percentage of shares outstanding is greater
than 200 percent (there are very few such observations). We then compute the standard
deviation across stock-quarters of each volume measure and the net order imbalance, relative
to each quarter’s cross-sectional mean, and winsorize all observations that are further than
2.5 standard deviations from their cross-sectional mean. That is, we replace such outliers
with the cross-sectional mean for the quarter plus or minus 2.5 standard deviations. This
winsorization procedure aﬀects between 2.50 and 3.15 percent of our data.
Figure 2 shows the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of TAQ total volume as
a percentage of shares outstanding in each quarter, in annualized percentage points. In the
early years of our sample period total volume averaged between 60 percent and 80 percent of
shares outstanding per year; this increased to between 80 percent and 100 percent in the later
years of the sample. These numbers are consistent with other recent studies such as Chen,
6Hong and Stein (2002) and Daves, Wansley and Zhang (2003).2 There is considerable cross-
sectional heterogeneity in volume as illustrated by the cross-sectional standard deviation of
3 0p e r c e n tt o4 0p e r c e n t .
Some of this cross-sectional heterogeneity can be explained by diﬀerences in the trading
patterns in small and large stocks. Table I reports means, medians, and standard deviations
across all ﬁrm-quarters, and across ﬁrm-quarters within each quintile of market capitaliza-
tion. Mean total volume ranges from 53 percent of shares outstanding in the smallest quintile
to 91 percent in the largest quintile. The distribution of total volume is positively skewed
within each quintile, so median volumes are somewhat lower but also increase with market
capitalization. The within-quintile annualized standard deviations (computed by multiply-
ing quarterly standard deviation by a factor of 200, under the assumption that quarterly
observations are iid) are fairly similar for stocks of all sizes, ranging from 27 percent to 33
percent.
Table I also reports the moments of the net order ﬂow for each size quintile. Mean net
order ﬂow increases strongly with market capitalization, ranging from —2.1 percent for the
smallest quintile to 4.5 percent for the largest quintile. This suggests that over our sample
period, there has been buying pressure in large stocks and selling pressure in small stocks,
with the opposite side of the transactions being accommodated by unclassiﬁable trades that
might include limit orders.3 This is consistent with the strong price performance of large
stocks during most of this period.
Unclassiﬁable volume is on average about 15 percent of shares outstanding in our dataset.
This number increases with ﬁrm size roughly in proportion to total volume; our algorithm
fails to classify 18 percent of total volume in the smallest quintile, and 21 percent of total
volume in the largest quintile. It is encouraging that the algorithm appears equally reliable
2These cross-sectional moments are calculated on an equal-weighted basis across ﬁrms, so to the ex-
tent that volume varies systematically with ﬁrm size, our measures will not correspond to total volume as
calculated for the exchange as a whole. Our measures represent the behaviour of the average ﬁrm.
3In support of this interpretation, net order ﬂow is strongly negatively correlated with Greene’s[ 1995]
measure of limit order depth for all size quintiles of stocks. This measure essentially identiﬁes a limit order
execution as the quoted depth when a market order execution is accompanied by a movement of the revised
quote away from the quoted midpoint.
7among ﬁrms of all sizes. Note that the means of buy volume, sell volume, and unclassiﬁable
volume do not exactly sum to the mean of total volume because each of these variables has
been winsorized separately.
Figure 2 summarizes the distribution of buy and sell volume across trade sizes. The
ﬁgure reports three histograms for the smallest quintile, the median quintile, and the largest
quintile of stocks. Since our trade size bins have diﬀerent widths, ranging from $1000 in
the second bin to $200,000 in the penultimate bin and even more in the largest bin, we
normalize each percentage of total buy or sell volume by the width of each bin, plotting
“trade intensities” rather than trade sizes within each bin. As the largest bin aggregates all
trades greater than $1 million in size, we arbitrarily assume that this bin has a width of $5
million.
It is immediately obvious from Figure 2 that trade sizes are positively skewed, and that
their distribution varies strongly with the market capitalization of the ﬁrm. In the smallest
quintile of stocks almost no trades of over $70,000 are observed, while such large trades are
commonplace in the largest quintile of stocks. A more subtle pattern is that in small stocks,
buys tend to be somewhat smaller than sells, while in large stocks the reverse is true.
Table II summarizes the distribution of trade sizes in a somewhat diﬀerent fashion. The
table reports the medians and cross-sectional standard deviations of total classiﬁable volume
(buys plus sells) in each trade size bin for each quintile of market capitalization. The rarity
of large trades in small stocks is apparent in the zero medians and tiny standard deviations
for large-size volume in the smallest quintile of ﬁrms.
2.3. Spectrum data
Our data on institutional equity ownership come from the Spectrum database, currently
distributed by Thomson Financial. They have been extensively cleaned by Kovtunenko
and Sosner (2003) to remove inconsistencies, and to ﬁll in missing information that can
be reconstructed from prior and future Spectrum observations for the same stock. A more
detailed description of the Spectrum data is presented in Appendix 2. Again, we ﬁrst ﬁlter
8the data by removing any observation for which the change in Spectrum recorded institutional
ownership as a percentage of ﬁrm shares outstanding is greater than 100 percent (there are
very few such observations). We then winsorize these data in the same manner as the TAQ
data, truncating observations that are more than 2.5 standard deviations away from each
quarter’s cross-sectional mean.
Table I reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of the change in institutional
ownership, as a percentage of shares outstanding. Across all ﬁrms, institutional ownership
increased by an average of 0.6 percent per year, but this overall trend conceals a shift by
institutions from small ﬁrms to large and especially mid-cap ﬁrms. Institutional ownership
fell by 1.3 percent per year in the smallest quintile but rose by 1.7 percent per year in the
median quintile and 0.8 percent per year in the largest quintile.
On average, then, institutions have been selling smaller stocks and buying larger stocks.
This corresponds nicely with the trade intensity histograms in Figure 3, which show that
the smallest stocks tend to have larger-size sales than buys, while the largest stocks have
larger-size buys than sells. If institutions more likely trade in large sizes, we would expect
this pattern. The behavior of mid-cap stocks is however anomalous in that these stocks
have larger-size sales than buys despite their growth in institutional ownership.
3. Predicting institutional ownership
3.1. Regression methodology
In the market microstructure literature, institutional trading behavior has generally been
identiﬁed using a cutoﬀ rule. Trades above an upper cutoﬀ size are classiﬁed as institutional,
trades below a lower cutoﬀ size are classiﬁed as individual, and intermediate-size trades are
unclassiﬁed. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) evaluate alternative cutoﬀ rules using the TORQ
dataset. As an example of their ﬁndings, they recommend an upper cutoﬀ of $20,000 in small
stocks. 84 percent of individual investors’ trades are smaller than this, and the likelihood
of ﬁnding an individual initiated trade larger than this size is 2 percent.
9Our methodology reﬁnes the idea of using an optimally chosen cutoﬀ rule. We match the
TAQ data at a variety of trade sizes to the Spectrum data for a broad cross-section of stocks,
over our entire sample period. That is, we use the intra-quarter tape to predict institutional
ownership at the end of the quarter. Our predictive regression combines information from
various trade size bins in the way that best explains the quarterly changes in institutional
ownership identiﬁed in Spectrum.
We begin with extremely simple regressions that ignore the information in trade sizes.
Writing Yit for the share of ﬁrm i that is owned by institutions at the end of quarter t, Uit
for unclassiﬁable trading volume, Bit for total buy volume, and Sit for total sell volume in
stock i during quarter t,w ee s t i m a t e
∆Yit = α + φYi,t−1 + βUUit + βBBit + βSSit + εit. (3.1)
This regression tells us how much of the variation in institutional ownership can be explained
simply by the upward drift in institutional ownership of all stocks (the intercept coeﬃcient α),
mean-reversion in the institutional share for particular stocks (the autoregressive coeﬃcient
φ), and the total unclassiﬁable, buy, and sell volumes during the quarter (the coeﬃcients βU,
βB,a n dβS). An even simpler variant of this regression restricts the coeﬃcients on buy and
sell volume to be equal and opposite, so that the explanatory variable becomes net order
ﬂow Fit = Bit − Sit and we estimate
∆Yit = α + φYi,t−1 + βUUit + βFFit + εit. (3.2)
We also consider variants of these regressions in which the intercept α is replaced by time
dummies that soak up time-series variation in the institutional share of the stock market
as a whole. In this case the remaining coeﬃcients are identiﬁed purely by cross-sectional
variation in institutional ownership, and changes in this cross-sectional variation over time.
Table III reports estimates of equation (3.1) in the top panel, and equation (3.2) in the
bottom panel. Within each panel, column A restricts the lagged dependent variable and
10unclassiﬁable volume to have zero coeﬃcients, column B restricts only the lagged dependent
variable, and column C is unrestricted. Columns D, E, and F repeat these speciﬁcations
including time dummies rather than an intercept. The results are remarkably consistent
across all speciﬁcations. On average, buy volume gets a coeﬃcient of about 0.36 and
sell volume gets a coeﬃcient of about —0.44. This suggests that institutions tend to use
market orders, buying at the ask and selling at the bid or buying on upticks and selling on
downticks, so that their orders dominate classiﬁable volume. The larger absolute value of
the sell coeﬃcient tells us that institutions are particularly likely to behave in this way when
they are selling. The autoregressive coeﬃcient is negative, and small but precisely estimated,
telling us that there is statistically detectable mean-reversion in institutional ownership.
The coeﬃcient on unclassiﬁable volume is small and only marginally signiﬁcant when buys
and sells are included separately in equation (3.1), but it becomes signiﬁcantly negative when
buys and sells are restricted to have equal and opposite coeﬃcients in equation (3.2). To
understand this, note that a stock with an equal buy and sell volume is predicted to have
declining institutional ownership in the top panel of Table III. The net ﬂow regression in the
bottom panel cannot capture this eﬀect through the net ﬂow variable, which is identically
zero if buy and sell volume are equal. Instead, it captures the eﬀect through a negative
coeﬃcient on unclassiﬁable volume, which is correlated with total volume.
Table IV repeats the unrestricted regressions, incorporating time dummies, for the ﬁve
quintiles of market capitalization. The main result here is that the coeﬃcients on buys, sells,
and net ﬂows are strongly increasing in market capitalization. Evidently trading volume
is more informative about institutional ownership in large ﬁrms than in small ﬁrms. The
explanatory power of these regressions is U-shaped in market capitalization, somewhat above
7 percent for the smallest and largest ﬁrms and just above 5 percent for the median size ﬁrms.
This is consistent with the fact, reported in Table II, that institutional ownership has the
greatest cross-sectional volatility in mid-cap ﬁrms.
113.2. The information in trade size
The above summary regressions ignore the information contained in trade size. We now
generalize our speciﬁcation to allow separate coeﬃcients on buy and sell volume in each trade
size bin:






βSZSZit + εit, (3.3)
where Z indexes trade size. In the case where we use net ﬂows rather than separate buys
and sells, the regression becomes
∆Yit = α + φYi,t−1 + βUUit +
X
Z
βFZFZit + εit. (3.4)
Table V estimates equation (3.4) separately for each quintile of market capitalization,
replacing the intercept α with time dummies. It is immediately apparent that the coeﬃcients
tend to be negative for smaller trades and positive for larger trades, consistent with the
intuition that order ﬂow in small sizes reﬂects individual buying while order ﬂow in large
sizes reﬂects institutional buying. There is however an interesting exception to this pattern.
Extremely small trades of less than $2,000 have a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient in the
smallest three quintiles of ﬁrms, and in all quintiles have a coeﬃc i e n tt h a ti sm u c hl a r g e r
than that for somewhat larger trades. This suggests either that institutions break trades
into extremely small sizes when they are “stealth trading” (trying to conceal their activity
from the market), or that institutions are likely to engage in “scrum trades” to round oﬀ
extremely small equity positions.4 A third possibility is that these trades are in fact by
individuals, but they are correlated with unobserved variables (such as news events). This
could generate unclassiﬁable volume from institutions in a direction consistent with small
4Chakravarty (2001) presents an in-depth analysis of stealth trading (deﬁned, consistently with Barclay
and Warner (1993) as the trading of informed traders that attempt to pass undetected by the market maker).
He shows that stealth trading (i.e., trading that is disproportionately likely to be associated with large price
changes) occurs primarily via medium-sized trades by institutions of 500-9,999 shares. This runs contrary
to our result here.
12trades.
These results are illustrated graphically in Figures 4 and 5. These ﬁgures standardize
the net ﬂow coeﬃcients, subtracting their mean and dividing by their standard deviation so
that the set of coeﬃcients has mean zero and standard deviation one. The standardized
coeﬃcients are then plotted against trade size. Figure 4 shows the net ﬂow coeﬃcients for
the median quintile together with a conﬁdence interval two standard errors above and below
the coeﬃcients, while Figure 5 shows the net ﬂow coeﬃcients for the smallest, median, and
largest quintiles. In all cases the trough for trade sizes between $2,000 and $30,000 is clearly
visible.
Figures 6 through 9 repeat the graphical presentation of coeﬃcients for the case where
buys and sells are included separately in the trade-size regression. The ﬁgures show a
trough and subsequent hump for buy coeﬃcients, and a hump and subsequent trough for
sell coeﬃcients, consistent with the net ﬂow results.
The information in trade sizes adds considerable explanatory power to our regressions.
Comparing the second panel in Table IV with Table V, the R2 statistics increase from 7.1
percent to 8.7 percent in the smallest quintile, from 5 percent to 11.4 percent in the median
quintile, and from 7.7 percent to 10.8 percent in the largest quintile. The correspond-
ing numbers for the trade-size regressions incorporating buys and sells separately are: R2
statistics increase from 7.2 to 10.9 percent in the smallest quintile, from 5.3 percent to 12.5
percent in the median quintile, and from 7.9 percent to 11.2 percent in the largest quintile.
Of course, these R2 statistics remain fairly modest,5 but it should not be surprising that
institutional trading activity is hard to predict given the incentives that institutions have to
conceal their activity and the considerable overlap between the trade sizes that may be used
by wealthy individuals and by smaller institutions.
Table VI shows that our regressions are a considerable improvement over the naive cutoﬀ
approach used in the previous market microstructure literature. The cutoﬀ model can
be thought of as a restricted regression where buys in sizes above the upper cutoﬀ get a
5Note that these R2 statistics are computed after time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects are removed.
13coeﬃcient of plus one, buys in sizes below the lower cutoﬀ get a coeﬃcient of minus one, and
buys in intermediate sizes get a coeﬃcient of zero. We estimate variants of this regression
in Table VI, allowing greater ﬂexibility in successive speciﬁcations. When the coeﬃcient
restrictions imposed by the naive approach are imposed, we ﬁnd that the R2 statistic in
most cases is negative. In fact, the R2 statistic given the restrictions on the ﬂows above and
below the cutoﬀs is never positive for the two smallest size quintiles, and maximized at 2.5
percent, 3.5 percent and 3.8 percent respectively for the median, fourth and largest quintiles
respectively. When we allow ﬂows above and below the cutoﬀst oh a v ef r e ec o e ﬃcients, the
R2 statistics of the regressions increase substantially but are still well below those of our
freely estimated regressions.
3.3. Smoothing the eﬀect of trade size
One concern about the speciﬁcations (3.3) and (3.4) is that they require the separate esti-
mation of a large number of coeﬃcients. This is particularly troublesome for small stocks,
where large trades are extremely rare; the coeﬃcients on large-size order ﬂow may just reﬂect
a few unusual trades. One way to handle this problem is to estimate a smooth function
relating the buy, sell, or net ﬂow coeﬃcients to the trade size of the bin. We have considered
polynomials in trade size, and also the exponential function suggested by Nelson and Siegel
(1987) to model yield curves. We ﬁnd that the Nelson and Siegel method is well able to
capture the shape suggested by our unrestricted speciﬁcations. For the net ﬂow equation,
the method requires estimating a function β(Z) that varies with trade size Z,a n di so ft h e
form:






Here b0,b 1,b 2,a n dτ are parameters to be estimated. The parameter τ is a constant that
controls the speed at which the bin-speciﬁcr e g r e s s i o nc o e ﬃcients decay to zero. We estimate
the function by nonlinear least squares, picking diﬀerent starting values of τ,t os e l e c tt h e
14function that maximizes the R2 statistic:









g2(Z)FZit + εit, (3.6)
where g1(Z)= τ
Z(1 − e−Z/τ) and g2(Z)= τ
Z(1 − e−Z/τ) − e−Z/τ.
Figure 10 presents the trade-size coeﬃcients implied by estimating (3.6). The pattern
of coeﬃcients in Figure 5 is accentuated and clariﬁed. As before, the ﬁgure standardizes
the net ﬂow coeﬃcients, subtracting their mean and dividing by their standard deviation so
that the set of coeﬃcients has mean zero and standard deviation one. The R2 statistics
from estimates of equation (3.6) are 8 percent for the smallest quintile of stocks, 9.9 percent
for the median quintile, and 9.3 percent for the largest quintile. Figures 11 and 12p r e s e n t
buy and sell coeﬃcients estimated using an analogous Nelson-Siegel speciﬁcation. Again,
the shapes suggested by Figures 7 and 9 appear in these ﬁgures.
The parsimony of equation (3.6) makes it relatively straightforward to explore changes
in the functional form over time, as well as interactions with ﬁrm characteristics and market
conditions. We hope to report the results of such explorations in the next draft of this
paper.
4. Conclusion
This paper has presented a technique for predicting quarterly institutional ownership using
the “tape”, the publicly available record of all trades and quotes within the quarter. The
technique can be used to track high-frequency institutional trading in a large cross-section of
stocks. In future research we plan to use this approach to measure patterns of institutional
behavior around earnings announcements, stock splits, and other corporate actions.
The results of this paper shed light on the trading behavior of institutions. Total
classiﬁable buy volume predicts increasing institutional ownership and total sell volume
predicts decreasing institutional ownership. That is, institutions tend to buy at the ask
and sell at the bid, or buy on upticks and sell on downticks, suggesting that they demand
15liquidity rather than provide it. The coeﬃcient on total sell volume is larger in absolute
value than the coeﬃcient on total buy volume, suggesting that institutions are particularly
likely to demand liquidity when they sell. All these patterns are more pronounced in large
stocks than in small stocks.
Classifying transactions by their size adds considerable explanatory power to our re-
gressions. Buy volume in sizes between $2,000 and $30,000 is associated with decreasing
institutional ownership, while buy volume in larger sizes predicts increasing institutional
ownership. Interestingly, extremely small buys below $2,000 also predict increasing institu-
tional ownership, suggesting that institutions use these trades to conceal their activity or to
round small positions up or down. All these patterns are reversed for sell volume, and are
remarkably consistent across ﬁrm sizes.
165. Appendices
5.1. Appendix 1: Buy-Sell Classiﬁcation
TAQ does not classify transactions as either buys or sells. To classify the direction of each
trade, we use a matching algorithm suggested by Lee and Ready (1991). This algorithm
looks at the trade price relative to quotes to determine whether a transaction is a buy or sell.
The method works by matching trades to pre-existing quotes, based on time stamps. More
precisely, we inspect quotes lagged by at least ﬁve seconds to avoid problems of stale reporting
of quotes. If the trade price lies between the quote midpoint and the upper (lower) quote,
the trade is classiﬁed as a buy (sell). If the trade price lies at the midpoint of the quotes,
we use a tick test, which classiﬁe st r a d e st h a to c c u ro na nu p t i c ka sb u y s ,a n dt h o s eo na
downtick as sells. If the trade price lies at the midpoint of the quotes and the transactions
price has not moved since the previous trade (trade occurs on a “zerotick”), Lee and Ready
suggest classifying the trade based on the last recorded move in the transactions price. If
the last recorded trade was classiﬁed as a buy (sell), then the zerotick trade is classiﬁed as
a buy (sell). From Lee and Ready, trade-to-quote matching can be accomplished in 75.7%
of trades, while tick tests are required in 23.8% of cases. The remaining trades take place
outside the quoted spread.
The analysis in Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) evaluates the eﬀectiveness of the Lee
and Ready matching algorithm, using the TORQ database, which has buy-sell classiﬁed,
institutional-individual identiﬁed data for 144 stocks over a 3 month period. They ﬁnd
that after removing trades with potentially ambiguous classiﬁcations (such as trades that
are batched or split up during execution), the buy/sell classiﬁcation algorithm is 93 percent
eﬀective. In particular, they ﬁnd that the accuracy is highest (at 98 percent) when trade-
to-quote matching can be accomplished, lower (at 76 percent) for those trades that have to
be classiﬁed using a tick test, and lowest (at 60 percent) for those trades classiﬁed using a
zerotick test.
We eliminate this last source of variability in our data by terming as unclassiﬁable those
17trades for which a zerotick test is required. We further identify as unclassiﬁable all trades
that occur in the ﬁrst half hour of trading (since these come from the opening auction) as
well as any trade that is reported as cancelled, batched or split up in execution. This last
category of trades is identiﬁed as unclassiﬁa b l es i n c ew eu s et r a d es i z ea so n ei m p o r t a n t
input into our prediction of institutional ownership. A trade that is reported as being
batched or split up cannot be unambiguously classiﬁed in terms of its size. We aggregate all
unclassiﬁable trades together, and use the bin of unclassiﬁable trades as an additional input
into our prediction exercise.
5.2. Appendix 2: Spectrum Institutional Ownership Data
A 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 required all institutions
with greater than $100 million of securities under discretionary management to report their
holdings to the SEC. Holdings are reported quarterly on the SEC’sf o r m13F, where all
common-stock positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 must be disclosed. These
reports are available in electronic form back to 1980 from CDA/Spectrum, a ﬁrm hired by the
SEC to process the 13F ﬁlings. Our data include the quarterly reports from the ﬁrst quarter
of 1993 to the ﬁnal quarter of 2001. Throughout this paper, we use the term institution to
refer to an institution that ﬁles a 13F. On the 13F, each manager must report all securities
over which they exercise sole or shared investment discretion. In cases where investment
discretion is shared by more than one institution, care is taken to prevent double counting.
Our Spectrum data have been extensively cleaned by Kovtunenko and Sosner (2003).
They ﬁrst identify all inconsistent records, those for which the number of shares held by an
institution in a particular stock at the end of quarter t − 1 is not equal to the number of
shares held at the end of quarter t minus the reported net change in shares since the prior
quarter. They assume that the holdings data are correct for such observations, rather than
the reported change data.
They proceed to ﬁll in missing records, using the general rule that if a stock has a return
on CRSP but does not have reported Spectrum holdings in a given quarter, holdings are set
18to zero. For the missing records inconsistent with this assumption (those for which holdings
at the end of quarter t are above the reported net change from previous quarter holdings),
they ﬁll in the holdings for the end of quarter t−1 as split-adjusted holdings in period t less
the reported net change in holdings.
The Spectrum 13F holdings ﬁle contains three columns: date, CUSIP code, identiﬁer for
the institution, and number of shares held in that stock by that institution on that date.
All dates are end-of-quarter (March 31, June 30, September 30, or December 31). For each
CUSIP and date we simply sum up the shares held by all institutions in the sample to get
total institutional holdings of the security at the end of that quarter.
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22Table I: Summary Statistics for Firm Size Quintiles 
 
Table I presents means, medians and standard deviations for the TAQ and Spectrum variables in our specifications.  
All data are independently winsorized at the 2.5 standard deviation level.  The variables are in sequence, the total 
buyer initiated orders in TAQ classified by the Lee and Ready algorithm; the total seller initiated orders, similarly 
classified; the total unclassifiable volume (those transacted in the opening auction, reported as cancelled, or 
unclassifiable as a buy or a sell by the LR algorithm); the total volume (the sum of the previous three variables); the 
net order imbalance (total classifiable buys less total classifiable sells); and finally, the change in quarterly 13-F 
institutional ownership as reported in the Spectrum dataset as a fraction of CRSP shares outstanding.  All TAQ 
variables are normalized by daily shares outstanding as reported in CRSP, and then summed up to the quarterly 
frequency.  All summary statistics are presented as annualized percentages (standard deviations are annualized under 
the assumption that quarterly observations are iid).  The columns report these summary statistics first for all firms, and 
then for firm size quintiles, where firms are sorted quarterly by market capitalization (size).       
 
 
  All Small Q2 Q3 Q4  Large
         
Mean        
TAQ Total Buys  31.83 20.88 27.42 33.56 39.20 38.04 
TAQ Total Sells  30.99 23.13 28.58 33.00 36.45 33.75 
TAQ Unclassifiable  15.39  9.66 13.21 15.94 18.85 19.29 
TAQ Total Volume  78.31 53.82 69.28 82.62 94.61 91.14 
TAQ Net Imbalance  0.96 -2.13 -1.08  0.63  2.87  4.49 
Spectrum Change  0.60  -1.31 0.29 1.73 1.49 0.77 
        
Median        
TAQ Total Buys  23.84 13.72 18.76 24.85 31.40 30.58 
TAQ Total Sells  23.90 15.80 20.63 25.58 29.90 27.41 
TAQ Unclassifiable  11.57 5.70 8.73  11.47  15.04  15.81 
TAQ Total Volume  60.42 36.43 49.26 63.03 77.00 74.35 
TAQ Net Imbalance  0.55 -1.22 -0.62  0.15  1.62  3.09 
Spectrum Change  0.43  -0.03 0.41 1.65 1.35 0.98 
        
Standard Deviation        
TAQ Total Buys  13.48 11.00 13.04 13.84 14.23 12.82 
TAQ Total Sells  12.40 11.32 12.55 12.81 12.83 11.30 
TAQ Unclassifiable  6.79 5.69 6.69 7.00 7.03 6.21 
TAQ Total Volume  31.68 27.09 31.27 32.62 33.06 29.46 
TAQ Net Imbalance  5.07 4.87 5.07 5.22 5.15 4.23 
Spectrum Change  8.94 7.48 9.40 9.87 9.59 8.03 
 Table II: Summary Statistics for Bins and Firm Size Quintiles 
Table II presents medians (top panel) and standard deviations (bottom panel) for total TAQ buys + sells classified by 
the Lee and Ready algorithm (normalized by firm shares outstanding).  All data are winsorized at the 2.5 standard 
deviation level.  All summary statistics are reported in annualized percentage terms (standard deviations are 
annualized under the assumption that quarterly observations are iid). 
 
Median  Small Q2 Q3 Q4  Large
       
B u y s   +   S e l l s        
0-2000  2.126 0.680 0.163 0.000 0.000 
2000-3000  1.727 0.728 0.409 0.166 0.000 
3000-5000  3.438 1.675 1.004 0.700 0.319 
5000-7000  2.597 1.738 1.045 0.691 0.405 
7000-9000  1.943 1.623 1.051 0.713 0.385 
9000-10000  0.793 0.710 0.512 0.330 0.139 
10000-20000  4.902 6.038 5.025 3.555 1.954 
20000-30000  2.056 3.351 3.526 3.070 1.831 
30000-50000  1.784 3.934 4.584 4.692 3.215 
50000-70000  0.544 2.378 3.085 3.353 2.630 
70000-90000  0.000 1.628 2.352 2.737 2.194 
90000-100000  0.000 0.586 0.998 1.180 0.988 
100000-200000  0.000 3.562 6.626 8.567 7.630 
200000-300000  0.000 1.329 3.411 5.059 5.064 
300000-500000  0.000 1.139 3.623 5.941 6.554 
500000-700000  0.000 0.000 1.853 3.452 4.116 
700000-900000  0.000 0.000 1.067 2.237 2.814 
900000-1000000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.792 1.087 
>1000000  0.000 0.000 4.018 9.543  14.178 
 
Standard Deviation  Small Q2 Q3 Q4  Large
       
B u y s   +   S e l l s        
0-2000  1.905 1.002 0.529 0.317 0.134 
2000-3000  1.095 0.744 0.459 0.324 0.197 
3000-5000  1.861 1.444 0.910 0.610 0.382 
5000-7000  1.575 1.348 0.910 0.610 0.404 
7000-9000  1.336 1.228 0.892 0.606 0.376 
9000-10000  0.658 0.620 0.477 0.332 0.224 
10000-20000  3.554 3.610 3.009 2.293 1.421 
20000-30000  2.013 2.243 2.080 1.835 1.245 
30000-50000  2.216 2.720 2.679 2.514 1.903 
50000-70000  1.317 1.757 1.799 1.753 1.470 
70000-90000  0.940 1.329 1.399 1.372 1.155 
90000-100000  0.427 0.606 0.642 0.635 0.542 
100000-200000  1.981 3.193 3.730 3.840 3.291 
200000-300000  1.047 1.736 2.214 2.395 2.132 
300000-500000  1.188 1.942 2.600 2.925 2.699 
500000-700000  0.705 1.178 1.615 1.832 1.786 
700000-900000  0.467 0.861 1.168 1.329 1.296 
900000-1000000  0.134 0.385 0.530 0.582 0.570 
> 1000000  1.949 3.481 4.655 5.791 5.865 Table III: Regression Specifications on Total Buys, Sells and Net Flows 
Table III presents estimates of several specifications, in which the dependent variable is the change in Spectrum 
institutional ownership as a fraction of shares outstanding.  The first panel below presents the independent variables in 
rows: an intercept, the lagged level of Spectrum institutional ownership as a percentage of the shares outstanding of 
the firm, the total unclassifiable volume in TAQ, total buyer initiated trades and total seller initiated trades.   The 
second panel uses the same first three independent variables, but uses total net flows (total buys less total sells) as the 
fourth independent variable.  Different specifications use different combinations of these independent variables.   
Specifications D-F are the same as specifications A-C, except that they incorporate quarter-specific time dummy 
variables.   White corrected t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.   
 
  A B C D E F
         
Intercept  0.007 0.007 0.012       
  (23.669) (23.588) (36.240)       
Lagged Spectrum Level     -0.016    -0.015 
     -(20.386)    -(20.174) 
TAQ Unclassifiable   0.046 0.045   0.011 0.009 
   (3.213) (3.160)   (0.669) (0.554) 
TAQ Total Buys  0.348 0.338 0.360 0.347 0.344 0.367 
  (32.879) (29.983) (32.022) (32.725) (29.965) (31.981) 
TAQ Total Sells  -0.429 -0.441 -0.438 -0.422 -0.425 -0.423 
  -(36.422) -(36.355) -(36.302) -(35.867) -(34.661) -(34.611) 
        
R-Squared  0.040 0.041 0.047 0.039 0.039 0.045 
N  66805 66805 66805 66805 66805 66805 
N(Firms)  3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 
        
Time Dummies?  No No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
 
  A B C D E F
         
Intercept  0.001 0.005 0.011       
  (4.421) (19.437) (35.136)       
Lagged Spectrum Level     -0.017    -0.016 
     -(23.283)    -(22.082) 
TAQ Unclassifiable   -0.113 -0.071   -0.115 -0.075 
   -(14.614)  -(8.711)   -(14.854)  -(9.137) 
TAQ Net Flows  0.337 0.371 0.387 0.338 0.373 0.388 
  (31.804) (33.924) (35.635) (31.910) (34.108) (35.687) 
        
R-Squared  0.029 0.036 0.045 0.030 0.037 0.045 
N  66805 66805 66805 66805 66805 66805 
N(Firms)  3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 
        
Time Dummies?  No No No Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Table IV: Size Quintile Specific Regressions of Spectrum Change on Total TAQ Flows 
 
This table presents estimates of specification F from Table III, estimated separately for stocks sorted into market 
capitalization quintiles.  The dependent variable in all specifications is the change in Spectrum institutional ownership 
as a fraction of shares outstanding.  The first panel below presents the independent variables in rows: the lagged level 
of Spectrum institutional ownership as a percentage of the shares outstanding of the firm, the total unclassifiable 
volume in TAQ, total buyer initiated trades and total seller initiated trades.   The second panel uses the same first three 
independent variables, but uses total net flows (total buys less total sells) as the fourth independent variable.  All 
specifications incorporate quarter-specific time dummy variables.  White corrected t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficients.   
 
  Small Q2 Q3 Q4  Large
       
Lagged Spectrum Level  -0.042 -0.029 -0.024 -0.024 -0.033 
  -(15.350) -(13.686) -(11.664) -(10.937) -(12.584) 
TAQ Unclassifiable  -0.075 0.024 0.072 0.042 0.032 
  -(2.273) (0.620) (1.945) (1.167) (0.913) 
TAQ Total Buys  0.164 0.204 0.330 0.461 0.557 
  (6.325) (7.636)  (12.999)  (17.957)  (20.120) 
TAQ Total Sells  -0.216 -0.270 -0.431 -0.530 -0.648 
  -(8.751) -(10.392) -(16.101) -(18.251) -(20.425) 
       
R-Squared  0.072 0.041 0.053 0.062 0.079 
N  13341 13370 13361 13349 13384 
N(Firms)  1198 1422 1366 1194  744 
       
Time Dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
  Small Q2 Q3 Q4  Large
       
Lagged Spectrum Level  -0.043 -0.030 -0.026 -0.026 -0.035 
  -(15.527) -(14.301) -(13.214) -(12.380) -(14.093) 
TAQ Unclassifiable  -0.143 -0.078 -0.088 -0.064 -0.101 
  -(8.407) -(4.152) -(4.668) -(3.572) -(5.833) 
TAQ Net Flows  0.193 0.236 0.366 0.480 0.578 
  (8.383) (9.883)  (15.322)  (19.335)  (21.181) 
       
R-Squared  0.071 0.040 0.050 0.061 0.077 
N  13341 13370 13361 13349 13384 
N(Firms)  1198 1422 1366 1194  744 
       
Time Dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
  
 Table V: Estimates of Spectrum-TAQ Quarterly Predictive Regression 
This table presents estimates from an equation relating quarterly Spectrum institutional ownership to TAQ for different 
size quintiles of stocks.  Here, the dependent variable is the change in quarterly 13-F institutional ownership from 
Spectrum (as a fraction of firm shares outstanding). In order, the dependent variables are the lagged level of the 
Spectrum institutional ownership fraction, the total unclassifiable volume in TAQ, and Net Flows, which are the 
number of shares bought less shares sold traded within dollar cutoff bins from TAQ (normalized by CRSP daily shares 
outstanding, and then summed up to the quarterly frequency). All specifications incorporate quarter-specific time 
dummy variables.  White corrected t-statistics are reported below coefficients in parentheses.  
 
 
  Small  Q2 Q3 Q4  Large
       
Lagged Spectrum Level  -0.041 -0.030 -0.027 -0.025 -0.035 
   -(15.014) -(14.347) -(13.927) -(12.017) -(13.416) 
Total Unclassifiable  -0.123 -0.051 -0.047 -0.065 -0.082 
  -(7.219) -(2.731) -(2.444) -(3.534) -(4.528) 
Net Flows       
0-2000  0.804 3.546 3.928 1.263 0.165 
   (4.755) (5.270) (2.807) (0.540) (0.033) 
2000-3000  -0.341 -0.334 -4.039 -2.719 -5.695 
   -(1.408) -(0.380) -(2.664) -(1.342) -(1.984) 
3000-5000  -0.653 -2.336 -1.833 -2.408 -2.142 
   -(4.414) -(4.409) -(1.764) -(1.692) -(1.013) 
5000-7000  -0.246 -1.490 -3.067  0.901 -3.787 
   -(1.652) -(3.072) -(3.014)  (0.547) -(1.925) 
7000-9000  -0.389 -0.852 -2.162 -2.420 -1.320 
   -(2.310) -(1.805) -(2.292) -(1.546) -(0.625) 
9000-10000  -0.051 -1.355 -3.707 -4.902  2.187 
   -(0.203) -(1.896) -(2.757) -(2.204)  (0.665) 
10000-20000  0.067 -0.931 -1.285 -1.927 -2.422 
   (0.799) -(4.199) -(3.416) -(2.784) -(2.142) 
20000-30000  0.072  0.025 -0.498 -1.073  1.209 
   (0.655)  (0.105) -(1.214) -(1.612)  (0.934) 
30000-50000  0.223 0.178 0.346 0.569  -0.179 
   (2.199) (0.979) (1.183) (1.262)  -(0.211) 
50000-70000  0.359 0.464 0.487 0.911 1.491 
   (2.917) (2.202) (1.478) (1.869) (1.997) 
70000-90000  0.490 0.658 0.382 1.007 1.501 
   (3.084) (2.855) (1.118) (2.096) (1.744) 
90000-100000  0.918 0.977 0.701 1.825  -0.086 
   (3.378) (2.741) (1.433) (2.517)  -(0.077) 
100000-200000  0.616 0.593 0.756 0.692 0.552 
   (6.552) (5.256) (5.226) (3.410) (1.566) 
200000-300000  0.313 0.888 1.027 0.990  -0.044 
   (2.481) (6.133) (6.138) (4.364)  -(0.122) 
300000-500000  0.202 0.508 0.934 0.940 0.364 
   (1.788) (4.377) (7.180) (5.533) (1.423) 
500000-700000  0.165 0.269 0.669 0.728 0.996 
   (0.980) (1.920) (4.396) (3.756) (3.621) 
700000-900000  0.318 0.380 1.024 1.057 2.178 
   (1.150) (2.344) (5.989) (5.053) (7.125) 
900000-1000000  1.889 0.477 0.431 1.158 3.573    (2.153) (1.467) (1.559) (3.536) (7.472) 
> 1000000  0.163 0.184 0.231 0.267 0.309 
  (2.438) (4.322) (6.253) (6.758) (6.694) 
       
2 R   0.087 0.075 0.114 0.103 0.108 
N  13341 13370 13361 13349 13384 
N(Firms)  1198 1422 1366 1194  744 
       
Time Dummies?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Table VI: Evaluating the Lee-Radhakrishna Method Using Spectrum and TAQ 
This table presents 
2 R  statistics for various specifications of the Lee-Radhakrishna regression (that employs a single 
cutoff level) of the change in quarterly 13-F institutional ownership as reported in the Spectrum dataset (as a fraction 
of CRSP shares outstanding O)  ) / ( , , t i t i O S ∆  on net quarterly flows from TAQ (normalized by CRSP daily shares 
outstanding, and then summed up to the quarterly frequency ).  Here , () it f c , represents net flows greater than $c, 
and , () it f c −  represents net flows less  than $c.  We estimate variants of the following specification: 
t i t i c t i c t i t i c f c f O S , , 2 , 1 , , ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ) / ( ε β β α + + − + = ∆ .   The specifications in rows labeled  t α α ˆ =  include 
quarter-specific time dummies.  The specification is estimated separately for different size quintiles of stocks (in 
columns).  Row headings indicate estimates of the 
2 R  statistic under different coefficient restrictions, for different 
values of the dollar cutoff levels c1 and c2.     
 
2 R   Small Q2 Q3 Q4  Large
       
C1 =2,000; c2=5,000       
1 , 1 , 0 2 1 = − = = c c β β α   -0.101 -0.105 -0.063 -0.032 -0.057 
1 , 1 , ˆ 2 1 = − = = c c t β β α α   -0.109 -0.107 -0.061 -0.017 -0.002 
2 2 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , 0 c c c c β β β β α = = =   0.024 0.020 0.033 0.046 0.037 
2 2 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ c c c c t β β β β α α = = =   0.024 0.020 0.040 0.049 0.045 
C1=3,000;c2=10,000          
1 , 1 , 0 2 1 = − = = c c β β α   -0.071 -0.084 -0.042 -0.020 -0.048 
1 , 1 , ˆ 2 1 = − = = c c t β β α α   -0.077 -0.084 -0.039 -0.006  0.005 
2 2 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , 0 c c c c β β β β α = = =   0.029 0.025 0.047 0.056 0.048 
2 2 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ c c c c t β β β β α α = = =   0.029 0.026 0.056 0.060 0.056 
C1=3,000;c2=20,000          
1 , 1 , 0 2 1 = − = = c c β β α   -0.047 -0.061 -0.022 -0.005 -0.037 
1 , 1 , ˆ 2 1 = − = = c c t β β α α   -0.049 -0.059 -0.017  0.008  0.014 
2 2 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , 0 c c c c β β β β α = = =   0.031 0.029 0.052 0.060 0.051 
2 2 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ c c c c t β β β β α α = = =   0.033 0.030 0.061 0.064 0.059 
C1=3,000;c2=50,000          
1 , 1 , 0 2 1 = − = = c c β β α   -0.026 -0.038 -0.001  0.015 -0.017 
1 , 1 , ˆ 2 1 = − = = c c t β β α α   -0.024  -0.035 0.007 0.024 0.026 
2 2 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , 0 c c c c β β β β α = = =   0.030 0.032 0.056 0.064 0.054 
2 2 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ c c c c t β β β β α α = = =   0.032 0.034 0.066 0.068 0.062 
C1=5,000;c2=100,000          
1 , 1 , 0 2 1 = − = = c c β β α   -0.029  -0.029 0.012 0.030 0.006 
1 , 1 , ˆ 2 1 = − = = c c t β β α α   -0.023  -0.021 0.025 0.035 0.038 
2 2 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , 0 c c c c β β β β α = = =   0.023 0.031 0.059 0.069 0.061 
2 2 1 1 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ c c c c t β β β β α α = = =   0.027 0.034 0.074 0.073 0.068 
       
N  13341 13370 13361 13349 13384 
N(Firms)  1198 1422 1366 1194  744 Figure 1 
This figure plots the evolution of the number of firms in our sample across time measured in quarters.  The sample 
consists only of firms issuing common stock on the NYSE or AMEX exchanges.  The data begin in the first quarter of 
1993, and end in the final quarter of 2000.   























This figure plots the mean and standard deviation across all firms each quarter of the total volume of shares traded as a 
percentage of shares outstanding for each firm.  The volume measure is obtained by summing all trades reported for 
each firm-quarter in the Transactions and Quotes (TAQ) database of the NYSE.  Total shares outstanding for each firm 
is obtained from CRSP. 







































































 Figure 3 
Figure 3 plots histograms of trade intensities (total volume as a percentage of shares outstanding in each bin divided by relative bin 
width), for dollar trade size bins that aggregate TAQ trades classified into buys and sells.  A bin size of $5 million is assigned to the 
largest bin.  The three panels show, in sequence, histograms for small, median and large firms sorted quarterly into quintiles based 
on relative market capitalization (size).   









































 Figure 4 
This figure plots the net flow coefficients for each trade size bin, for the Q3 firms in our sample.  The coefficients are 
standardized by removing the within quintile cross-sectional mean of bin coefficients, and dividing by the cross-
sectional standard deviation of bin coefficients. The dashed lines are +/- 2 OLS standard error bounds.   









































































































































































































































This figure plots the net flow coefficients for each trade size bin, for the Q1, Q3 and Q5 firms in our sample.  The 
coefficients are standardized by removing the within quintile cross-sectional mean of bin coefficients, and dividing by 
the cross-sectional standard deviation of bin coefficients.  











































































































































































































































This figure plots the buy coefficients for each trade size bin, for the Q3 firms in our sample.  The coefficients are 
standardized by removing the within quintile cross-sectional mean of bin coefficients, and dividing by the cross-
sectional standard deviation of bin coefficients. The dashed lines are +/- 2 OLS standard error bounds.   






































































































































































































































This figure plots the buy coefficients for each trade size bin, for the Q1, Q3 and Q5 firms in our sample.  The 
coefficients are standardized by removing the within quintile cross-sectional mean of bin coefficients, and dividing by 
the cross-sectional standard deviation of bin coefficients.  
 






































































































































































































































This figure plots the sell coefficients for each trade size bin, for the Q3 firms in our sample.  The coefficients are 
standardized by removing the within quintile cross-sectional mean of bin coefficients, and dividing by the cross-
sectional standard deviation of bin coefficients. The dashed lines are +/- 2 OLS standard error bounds.   





































































































































































































































This figure plots the sell coefficients for each trade size bin, for the Q1, Q3 and Q5 firms in our sample.  The 
coefficients are standardized by removing the within quintile cross-sectional mean of bin coefficients, and dividing by 
the cross-sectional standard deviation of bin coefficients.  






































































































































































































































 Figure 10 
This figure plots the net flow coefficients estimated using the method of Nelson and Siegel [1987] for each trade size 
bin, for the Q1, Q3 and Q5 firms in our sample.  The coefficients are standardized by removing the within quintile 
cross-sectional mean of bin coefficients, and dividing by the cross-sectional standard deviation of bin coefficients.  











































































































































































































































This figure plots the buy coefficients estimated using the method of Nelson and Siegel [1987] for each trade size bin, 
for the Q1, Q3 and Q5 firms in our sample.  The coefficients are standardized by removing the within quintile cross-
sectional mean of bin coefficients, and dividing by the cross-sectional standard deviation of bin coefficients.  






































































































































































































































This figure plots the sell coefficients estimated using the method of Nelson and Siegel [1987] for each trade size bin, 
for the Q1, Q3 and Q5 firms in our sample.  The coefficients are standardized by removing the within quintile cross-
sectional mean of bin coefficients, and dividing by the cross-sectional standard deviation of bin coefficients.  
Standardized Sell Coefficients For Different Trade Sizes
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